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The hospital is the fulcrum for the health maintenance
system of its surrounding community. The institution's emer-
gency room is frequently the entrance point into today's
health care system. Hospitals face two difficulties in providing
emergency service. First, it is difficult to staff full-time emer-
gency departments. Second, the malpractice fees to cover the
emergency rooms are prohibitive. As a result, hospitals look to
independent professional corporations to administer their
emergency rooms. This article will show that this decision
does not limit hospitals' liability for malpractice actions by
the corporations' physicians in the emergency rooms.
Utilization of the emergency room in the United States
has increased dramatically over the past thirty years. The
American Hospital Association reports that 78.3% of the na-
tion's hospitals operate emergency departments.' Emergency
outpatient visits in 1954 numbered approximately nine mil-
lion. By 1958, that figure had doubled, and by 1968 nearly
thirty-six million were recorded. Projections indicate that vis-
its will total almost 160 million by 1984.2
There are numerous reasons for the large number of
emergency departments and the substantial growth in the
number of patient visits. First, there has been a significant
decline in the number of general practitioners who are willing
to make housecalls. Second, the emergency room is open
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twenty-four hours each day and is able to handle most medi-
cal situations with better equipment and facilities than pri-
vate offices. Third, many people consider the emergency de-
partment to be their community medical center.'
The hospitals find it financially rewarding to provide such
care. Under Internal Revenue Ruling 69-545,' hospitals are
able to qualify for tax exempt status in one of two ways. The
hospital can either operate "to the extent of its financial abil-
ity" for those patients incapable of paying their bills or can
conduct its emergency room services on an "open door" basis,
even if all inpatients are expected to pay for all medical ser-
vices.' In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organi-
zation,6 the United States Supreme Court effectively disal-
lowed any further challenges to the Internal Revenue Ruling.
In addition, hospitals have established emergency services
to comply with their state penal statutes. Six states have re-
quired their hospitals to give aid to persons in need of emer-
gency care.7 In 1927, Illinois enacted a statute which has
served as a model for the other statutes. In its present form
the statute provides:
Every hospital required to be licensed by the Department
of Public Health pursuant to the Hospital Licensing Act
... which provides general medical and surgical hospital
services shall provide a hospital emergency service in ac-
cordance with rules and regulations adopted by the De-
partment of Public Health and shall furnish such hospital
emergency services to any applicant who applies for the
same in case of injury or acute medical condition where
the same is liable to cause death or severe injury or seri-
ous illness.8
Violation of the statute is a petty offense9 punishable by a fine
not to exceed $10,000.10
3. Id. at 22.
4. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 501(c)(3).
5. Bernstein, Hospital Emergency Services and The Law, 51 HOSPITALS 100
(1977).
6. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
7. Kucera, supra note 2, at 22. The six states are Illinois, Tennessee, California,
New York, Florida, and Wyoming.
8. Emergency Medical Treatment Act § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112 , § 86
(Smith-Hurd 1977).
9. Id. at § 87.
10. Id. at § 87(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81).
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New York enacted a general statute in 1969 which has an
unusual variation. The statute specifies that: "Every general
hospital shall admit any person who is in need of immediate
hospitalization with all convenient speed and shall not before
admission question the patient . . concerning insurance,
credit or payment of charges . . ... 11 Moreover, the legisla-
ture added the following section in 1973 which necessitates
that, "[In cities with a population of one million or more, a
general hospital must provide emergency medical care and
treatment to all persons in need of such care and treat-
ment." Noncompliance with the statute can result in suspen-
sion or revocation of the hospital's license. s
Florida's statute requires all hospitals with emergency de-
partments to open that facility to the public, providing that:
"[N]o person shall be denied treatment for any emergency
medical condition which will deteriorate from failure to pro-
vide such treatment at any hospital . . . that operates an
emergency department providing emergency treatment to the
public. 14 Statutory violation constitutes a second degree mis-
demeanor.15 Conviction may result in imprisonment up to
sixty days and a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars.16
Recently, federal legislation has been enacted reflecting
the public's interest in developing, financing, and expanding
all aspects of emergency medical services. These acts have
imposed on hospitals a duty to treat all patients seeking medi-
cal help.
Finally, some physicians prefer to work for emergency
room services. As contract physicians, they have guaranteed
incomes, flexible scheduling, and no "on-call" involvement.
This allows for leisure time to fulfill personal and family in-
terests and obligations. Contract physicians have no profes-
sional overhead expenses such as secretarial salaries or office
space. Moreover, they are not involved in patient billing or
collection. The physicians can practice medicine without be-
ll. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(1) (McKinney 1977).
12. Id. at § 2805-b(2).
13. Kucera, supra note 2, at 23.
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 401.45 (West Supp. 1982).
15. Id. at § 401.41.
16. Id. at §§ 775.082-.083.
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 295f-2(a)(14), 295f(6), 300d to 300d-9 (1976), discussed in
Commentary, The Emergency Medical Service Systems Act of 1973, 230 J. A.M.A.
1139 (1974).
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ing cognizant of the business ramifications.
The emergency room situation appears an ideal arrange-
ment for the hospital, public, and physicians. As the number
of emergency room facilities and the number of patient visits
have increased, however, the number of malpractice claims
arising out of the emergency room have also increased. In
1971 and 1972, for example, the emergency room accounted
for twelve percent of all malpractice claims against the
hospital."8
II. PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL RELATIONSHIPS
Three types of physicians work in the emergency room of
the hospital: staff physicians, private doctors, and contract
physicians. The courts have placed legal responsibility for the
negligent injury of patients by the hospital's staff physician
directly on the hospital.19 A master-servant relationship exists
between the hospital and the physician, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, whereby the institution is liable for any
injury to a patient due to negligence of the physician acting
within his scope of employment.' 0 The courts use four main
criteria to substantiate the existence of the master-servant re-
lationship: the physician (1) is salaried by the hospital, (2)
spends all his working hours under the direction of the hospi-
tal, (3) devotes all of his professional energies to the hospital,
and (4) does not maintain a practice of his own."
The private physician is an independent contractor." The
hospital merely provides the necessary equipment and ser-
vices to care for the patient. Under these conditions the hos-
pital cannot be responsible for the negligence of the private
doctor even though the injury occurs within the hospital' s and
the patient has come in contact with other members of the
18. Kucera, supra note 2, at 22. See generally Sachs, Malpractice Prophylaxis:
Emergency Room Liability, 75 KAN. MED. Soc'y J. 360, 360 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Valentin v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359
(1946); Newton County Hosp. v. Nickolson, 132 Ga. App. 164, 207 S.E.2d 659 (1974);
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
20. Newton County Hosp. v. Nickolson, 132 Ga. App. 164, 166, 207 S.E.2d 659,
661-62 (1974).
21. See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 2d 305, 309 (1960).
22. Id. at 315.
23. See, e.g., Mayers v. Litlow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957);
Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 II. App. 3d 987, 284 N.E.2d 676 (1972); Lun-
dahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Aaa'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (1968).
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hospital's staff.2 4 It is irrelevant whether the outside attending
physician has "staff privilege" at the hospital because such
privilege merely allows the physician to use the hospital for
his or her private patient.2 5 The courts have recognized that
the outside attending physician receives no salary from the
hospital, and, as such, he or she is an independent contractor
relieving the hospital of any liability for the physician's
malpractice.2 6
Many hospitals have signed contracts with professional
corporations to staff their emergency rooms with physicians.
The scope of liability of the contract agency, the hospital, and
the contract physician, in the event of a malpractice claim is
unclear. If the physician is an employee of the hospital, then
that institution is responsible under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.2 7 If the physician is an independent contractor,
the hospital can still be held liable under the "ostensible
agency" theory.2 8 Regardless of the physician's status, the
hospital may be held accountable under a corporate negli-
gence theory.29 This article examines the medical malpractice
liability of hospitals for negligent acts committed by physi-
cians who are not on the hospital's staff under each of three
theories: (1) respondeat superior, (2) ostensible agency, and
(3) corporate negligence.
A. Respondeat Superior
Earlier cases reflected the belief that a hospital was only
responsible for administrative acts of the physicians.30 Admin-
istrative acts which have given rise to liability have included:
transfer of a patient from one hospital to another, 1 use of an
electric cauterizing instrument which ignited alcohol on the
24. See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 2d at 325-32.
25. See Smith v. Klebenoff, 84 N.M. 50, 499 P.2d 368, cert. denied, 84 N.M. 37,
499 P.2d 355 (1972); Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Re-
sponsibilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv.
429, 440 (1973).
26. See cases cited supra note 23; Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227
N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
27. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
30. See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 2d 305, 317-320 (1960).
31. Jones v. City of New York Hosp., 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 286 A.D. 825, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955).
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patient's abdomen,"2 administration of transfusions without
written orders," and having a suicidal patient moved to a
dangerous location. The courts, however, refused to hold the
hospital responsible for medical acts of the physician. 35 Negli-
gent medical acts which resulted from the physician's special-
ized knowledge could not be imputed to the hospital. The
courts considered such acts as part of and treatment of the
illness itself.
This administrative act-medical act dichotomy was
firmly rejected by the New York Court of Appeals in Bing v.
Thunig 6 The court saw no valid reasons for specifically ex-
cluding material practitioners if other highly skilled profes-
sionals were not excluded from the applicaton of the doctrine
of respondeat superior. The New York Court of Appeals com-
mented on the changing role of hospitals in our society:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to
treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its
doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to pro-
cure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer
reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of
operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish
facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary
basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as
well as administrative and manual workers, and they
charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting
for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly,
the person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities' expect
that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its
nurses or other employees will act on their own
responsibility.
Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibili-
ties borne by everyone else. There is no reason to con-
tinue their exemption from the universal rule of respon-
deat superior."7
32. City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So.2d 721 (1942).
33. Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 A.D. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1946), afl'd per
curiam, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
34. Fowler v. Norways Sanatorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415 (1942).
35. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.
92 (1914); Lewis v. Columbus Hosp., 1 A.D.2d 444, 151 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1956); Davie v.
Lenox Hill Hosp., 81 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1948).
36. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
37. Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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Today, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
hospital is liable to a third person for any injury which proxi-
mately results from the tortious conduct of any employee act-
ing within his scope of employment.3 8 A determination must
first be made as to whether the relationship between the hos-
pital and the physician is that of master-servant. Although
the factors the courts have developed to test this relationship
are simple and certain, applying them is extremely difficult. A
master-servant relationship is one in which the employer as-
sumes the right to control the time, manner, and method of
executing the work, as distinguished from the right to require
certain definite results. 9 Actual control is the critical factor.
The test of control should be viewed objectively. Hospitals
manage the actual operations of their emergency rooms. They
virtually control the actions of the contract physician through
medical staff rules and regulations.4 A pertinent example is
the Emergency Service Guidelines prepared by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). The 1981
JCAH Manual imposes responsibility on the hospital to insure
and monitor the quality of health care provided at the hospi-
tal.'* Specifically it declares that emergency patient care rules
and procedures must be approved and reviewed annually by
medical staff and hospital administrators .4 The manual lists
specific preestablished criteria that must be included in the
rules and procedures. 43 Contract physicians are "members of
the medical staff" and must meet all requirements necessary
to become staff members.4 The hospital must continuously
review the quality and appropriateness of patient care
38. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master Servant § 404 (1970).
39. Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747, 41 S.E.2d 133 (1947); St. Paul-Mercury Indem.
Co. v. Alexander, 84 Ga. App. 207, 65 S.E.2d 694 (1951); Weiss v. Kling, 96 Ga. App.
618, 101 S.E.2d 178 (1957).
40. Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976). See
also Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977), wherein
the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant on similar facts. Although the
hospital had adopted rules governing emergency room procedures and had imposed
restrictions on the outside practice of doctors employed by its director of emergency
room services, the court found no employer-employee relationship. But see Hodges v.
Doctors Hosp., 141 Ga. App. 649, 234 S.E.2d 116 (1977) (jury may infer a contract
where physician had arrangement with hospital to "cover" the emergency room).
41. ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1981).
42. Id. at 28-29.
43. Id. at 29-30.
44. Id. at 26.
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through the establishment of quality control mechanisms.4 In
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,"' the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the standards adopted by
professional non-government organizations such as the JCAH
are admissible evidence to provide a basis for defining the
standard of care that the hospital and its personnel must
practice.
In Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital,47 the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court found a hospital respon-
sible for the decedent's death as a result of the emergency
room contract physician's negligent failure to administer
blood in time to prevent irreversible shock. The court stated:
While conducting the operations of the Emergency Room,
the doctor was to do so in accordance with the rules and
regulations of defendant hospital's governing board.
Thus, under the contract, the doctor was not only bound
to achieve a certain result, i.e., direct and supervise the
Emergency Room, but was controlled by the defendant
hospital as to the means or manner of achieving this re-
sult. Since the hospital controlled the manner in which
the doctor operated the emergency room, Dr. Bitash [con-
tract physician] was not an independent contractor but
an employee of the defendant hospital.8
The contract doctor performs services which are an "in-
herent function of the hospital, a function without which the
hospital could not properly achieve its purpose."' 9 A signifi-
cant relationship exists between the contract physician and
the hospital.50 The following factors support this significant
45. Id. at 33-34.
46. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 331, 211 N.E.2d 253, 256-57 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966). Other courts have also held that standards sponsored by professional non-
government organizations are admissible on the issue of the appropriate standard of
care for doctors. In Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963), the stan-
dards of electroshock treatment prepared by the American Psychiatric Association
were admissible as evidence of the requisite standard of care. See also Steeves v.
United States, 294 F.Supp. 446 (D. S.C. 1968) where the court relied on the AMA
Principles of Medical Ethics and AHA Standards of Hospital Accreditation.
47. 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976).
48. Id. at 452-53, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529 citing Matter of Morton, 284 N.Y. 167, 30
N.E.2d 369 (1940).
49. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 170, 500 P.2d 1153, 1158
(1972).
50. Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 108, 579 P.2d 970, 975




relationship: (1) contract physicians have guaranteed sala-
ries;51 (2) the hospital bills for the physician's services;" (3)
the physician did not engage in private practice;" (4) the hos-
pital owned the equipment used by the physician;" (5) the
hospital furnished all supporting technicians involved in pa-
tient care;55 (6) the patient had no choice in selecting the phy-
sician, the hospital making the choice for the patient.56 Note
that these significant factors are identical to the relationship a
staff physician has to the hospital. As previously mentioned, a
staff physician's negligence is imputed to the hospital through
the master-servant doctrine.
B. Ostensible Agency
Ostensible agency originated in the law of agency. In
Seneris v. Haas,5 7 the California Supreme Court held that a
hospital can be liable for the conduct of a nonemployee if a
patient could reasonably believe that such a person was an
employee of the hospital and the hospital had done nothing to
dispel that belief. This ostensible agency theory has been de-
scribed in the Restatement of Agency as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon
the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to lia-
bility to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other
agent as if he were such."
Liability is imposed under an estoppel theory, rather than
under a contract theory.5 9 The courts must decide whether an
actual agency between the employer and the non-employee
51. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972); Over-
street v. Doctors Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977); Mduba v. Benedic-
tine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976).
52. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972); Ruck-
er v. High Point Hosp., Inc., 20 N.C. App. 650, 202 S.E.2d 610 (1974).
53. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972); Ruck-
er v. High Point Hosp., Inc., 20 N.C. App. 650, 202 S.E.2d 610 (1974).
54. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
59. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 580, 405 A.2d 443, 446
(1979).
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appears likely.60 The test is subjective: has the principal (hos-
pital) through its voluntary act placed the nonemployee (con-
tract physician) in such a situation that a person of ordinary
prudence, acquainted with the nature of the particular busi-
ness, is justified in presuming that such nonemployee has the
principal's authority to perform the particular act?6'
There are certain presumptions held by the courts. First,
the hospital is involved in the business of providing health
care services. A patient is admitted to the hospital for no rea-
son other than to receive this care.2 Second, the determina-
tion of whether to admit a given patient to the hospital
through the emergency room is frequently made by doctors
and staff acting on behalf of the hospital." Third, the chang-
ing role of the hospital in our society has resulted in the pa-
tient looking to the institution, rather than the individual
physician, to provide health care. The Superior Court of New
Jersey took judicial notice of the public's reasonable expecta-
tion of emergency room physicians, stating, "[Pleople who
seek medical help through emergency room facilities of mod-
ern-day hospitals are unaware of the status of the various pro-
fessionals working there. '64 The patient has no duty to in-
quire of each person who treats him whether he is an
employee or independent contractor of the hospital. 5 It is ab-
surd to require a patient to ask such a question when he is
suffering excruciating pain.
Some courts justify a finding of ostensible agency when a
hospital "holds out" to the public that the contract physician
is its employee.6 6 The courts have relied on the following to
support their rulings: (1) the public is not informed of the in-
dependent status of the contracting physician," (2) all drugs
and equipment supplied to the contracting physician came
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 274, 378 A.2d 1121, 1124 (1977).
63. See Methodist Hospital v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961).
64. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. at 583, 405 A.2d at 447.
65. Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429
(1978).
66. Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1957); Howard v. Park, 37 Mich.
App. 496, 497, 195 N.W.2d 39, 40 (1972); Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St.
133, 137, 191 N.E.2d 821, 823 (1965); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App.
98, 115, 579 P.2d 970, 978-79 (1978).




from the hospital," (3) medical treatment took place inside
the hospital,69 (4) the hospital chose the contracting physi-
cian,70 (5) the patient was given written instruction advising
him to return for further treatment to the emergency room if
he could not contact his personal physician,7 (6) the hospital
bill for the contracting physician's services contained the logo
of the hospital. The application of ostensible agency to the
hospital and physician relationship continues to be strongly
supported by case law.7
C. Corporate Negligence
Hospital liability for corporate negligence originated in
1965 in the Illinois Supreme Court case of Darling v. Charles-
ton Community Memorial Hospital.74 Corporate negligence
differs from respondeat superior and ostensible agency in that
the duty of care generates from the hospital and is owed di-
rectly to the patient. Consequently, the hospital is liable for
negligent acts of physicians who are employees as well as in-
dependent contractors.
In Darling, the Illinois Supreme Court held the hospital
liable for the malpractice of an independent contractor physi-
cian who improperly applied a cast to a patient's leg. The
court determined that the hospital had a duty to supervise its
physicians and the care they provided. This case introduced
the concept of the hospital's responsibility for medical treat-
ment, compelling hospitals to become more directly involved
68. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Quintal v. Laurel
Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1964).
69. Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972).
70. Id.
71. Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 115, 579 P.2d 970, 979
(1978).
72. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. at 578, 405 A.2d at 446.
73. See, e.g., Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Mehlman v.
Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977); Grewe v. Mount Clemens Hosp., 404
Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429 (1978); Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d
39 (1972); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976);
Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1965); Adamski v.
Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978). But see Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979).
74. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
75. See generally Note, The Hospital's Responsibility for its Medical Staff:
Prospects for Corporate Negligence in California, 8 PAc. L.J. 141 (1977).
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in patient care over the ensuing fifteen years.71
Subsequent cases have recognized the hospital's affirma-
tive duty in insuring that only competent physicians are se-
lected and remain on the medical staff. The hospital must act
with due care in selecting members of the medical staff. In
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital,77 the New Jersey Supe-
rior Court held a hospital could be liable "because of the
wrongful act in placing an incompetent [physician] in a posi-
tion to do harm." 8 The court argued that such a ruling will
cause the level of medical care to rise within the state and
benefit the public as a result."
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Mitchell County Author-
ity v. Joiner,"0 concluded that a hospital may incur liability if
it accepts an incompetent physician on its staff, even though
it relied on the hospital's medical staff or the state's licensure
process to determine competence."' The hospital could not ab-
dicate its responsibility for staff selection, even though Geor-
gia law permitted the medical staff to perform this function."
These cases show that a hospital cannot limit its liability by
delegating its selection of contract physicians to a professional
corporation. The JCAH has imposed liability for selection of
contract physicians on the hospital since these physicians are
members of the hospital staff.8" All appointments made by the
professional corporation of incompetent physicians will be im-
puted to the hospital.
Finally, hospitals have been found liable under the corpo-
rate negligence theory for failing to assure the continued com-
petence of its medical staff. In Purcell v. Zimbelman,8 4 the
Arizona Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict stating that a
76. J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 315-17 (1977) (discussing Dar-
ling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
77. 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975).
78. Id. at 307, 350 A.2d at 537.
79. Id. at 311, 350 A.2d at 539.
80. 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
81. Id. at 142-43, 189 S.E.2d at 414.
82. Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 2-3, 186 S.E.2d 307,
308 (1971).
83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84. 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972). The plaintiff, injured as a result of an
inappropriate operation, sued both his independently retained physician and the hos-
pital. He alleged that the hospital had a duty to limit use of its facilities to profes-
sionally competent staff doctors employing acceptable medical procedures. Id. at 80,
500 P.2d at 340.
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hospital had been negligent in failing to review a physician's
competence after two previous malpractice suits had been
filed which involved similar surgical procedures. 85 In Gonzales
v. Nork,e the Superior Court for Sacramento County found a
hospital liable for failing to adequately review the perform-
ance of its staff. In that case a physician performed at least
thirty-five unnecessary operations to support his drug habit.
It is clear from this analysis of case law and from the guide-
lines of JCAH87 that a hospital must constantly monitor the
qualifications and performance of its medical staff, including
those of contract physicians.88
III. CONCLUSION
Case law demonstrates that a hospital will not be held
vicariously liable for its nonhospital-based staff physicians'
malpractice. The institution shares no economic or other rela-
tionship with the physician sufficient to show the existence of
a master-servant relationship." A physician employed by the
hospital is considered a servant under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior. A physician so employed participates in an eco-
nomic relationship with the hospital as a regularly salaried
employee, and hospital control is implied by the existence of a
formal employment relationship.90 A contract physician shares
an economic relationship with the hospital by receiving a fixed
salary, but his formal employment contract is with a profes-
sional corporation, not the hospital. The courts are divided as
to whether this physician should be regarded as an indepen-
dent contractor or an employee of the hospital. The author
submits that, regardless of the physician's status, the hospital
will be responsible for the contract physician's malpractice
85. Id. at 83-84, 500 P.2d at 343-44.
86. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. of Sacramento Co., Nov. 27, 1973), rev'd, 60 Cal.
App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976). Although the Nork decision was not binding
upon the hospital, it has nonetheless received widespread attention from the hospital
industry. See, e.g., Hedgepeth, Trial Court Finds Hospital "Strict Liable" For Physi-
cian Negligence, 3 HosP. MED. STAFF 8 (1974).
87. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
88. See generally Note, Torts-Medical-Malpractice-Hospital May Be Held
Liable for Permitting Incompetent Independent to Operate, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 177
(1976).
89. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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under respondeat superior," ostensible agency,9" or corporate
negligence theories."
What can a hospital do to limit its liability? Some courts
have held that a contract between the hospital and the emer-
gency room physician will destroy a master-servant relation-
ship.94 The hospital can exculpate itself from respondeat su-
perior by stating that the hospital will not "exercise any
control over the means employed by the [director] in the per-
formance of his departmental services," 95 and that the direc-
tor of the emergency room, in turn, will be solely responsible
for the "results of the services being consistent with the ex-
isting standards of his profession."96 The hospital can exercise
a limited surveillance over the emergency room services in or-
der to monitor the quality of hospital care but must exert very
little control over the manner of patient treatment."
Under the ostensible agency concept, however, the con-
tract between the hospital and a contract physician will not
limit the institution's liability. Ostensible agency is a subjec-
tive standard and a patient will be unaware of the contract
that existed between the two parties. In Mduba v. Benedic-
tine Hospital" the court found that a patient was not bound
by the secret limitations of such a contract. Notice must be
given to the patient of the contract physician's nonemployee
status at the first instance the patient appears in the emer-
gency room. This can be accomplished by signs posted on
walls and applicable treatment consent forms providing this
information. In addition, the physician should wear a uniform
different from other hospital professionals and wear a badge
stating with which professional corporation he is associated.
The physician's prescription pads should also indicate his
nonemployee status.
A hospital can take preventive steps to eliminate possible
corporate negligence judgments by an active role in the selec-
tion of contract physicians and by monitoring their compe-
91. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
94. Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977); Pogue
v. Hoop. Auth., 120 Ga. App. 230, 170 S.E.2d 52 (1969).
95. Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 142 Ga. App. at 896, 237 S.E.2d at 214.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 52 A.D. 450, 452, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1976).
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tence. This can be accomplished by applying the same quality
assurance controls to contract physicians as applied to staff
physicians. Only in this way can the hospital safeguard pa-
tient care and protect itself from corporate liability.

